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INSIDER LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 16(b) REQUIRES A FINDING OF
DIRECT PECUNIARY BENEFIT
CB! Industries, Inc. v. Horton, 682 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1982)
In CBI Industries, Inc. v. Horton I the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that a corporate director who purchased stock of the corpo-
ration within six months of selling some of his own shares was not
liable to the corporation for his profits under section 16(b) 2 of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, 3 when he purchased the stock in his
capacity as co-trustee of two irrevocable trusts created for the benefit of
his two adult sons.
The defendant Horton, a director of plaintiff CBI Industries ("CBI"),
sold 3000 of his shares of CBI common stock on the open market in
October of 1980 for $61.50 per share.4 In March of 1981 Horton made
an open market purchase of 2000 shares of the stock, at $48.875 per
share,5 for two trusts of which he was co-trustee and his two adult sons
1. 682 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1982).
2. This section, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976), provides as follows:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the
issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase,
of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period
of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection
with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irre-
spective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in
entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing
the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit may be
instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by
the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer
shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently
to prosecute the same thereafter-, but no such suit shall be brought more than two years
after the date such profit was realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover
any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the
purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction
or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not com-
prehended within the purpose of this subsection.
Apphcation of this provision extends to "[elvery person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial
owner of more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted
security) . . . or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of such security .... Id at
§ 78p(a).
3. Securities Exchange Act, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-78kk (1976)).
4. CBI Industries, Inc. v. Horton, 530 F. Supp. 784, 785 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd 682 F.2d 643, 644
(7th Cir. 1982).
5. 682 F.2d at 644. Although the Seventh Circuit assumed that Horton bought the shares
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were beneficiaries. 6  CBI subsequently brought suit7 to recover Hor-
ton's short-swing profits.' The District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois granted CBI's motion for summary judgment, ruling that
Horton was the beneficial owner,9 as a matter of law, of the stock that
he purchased for the trusts. 10 The Seventh Circuit, in a two to one
decision," reversed and held: A corporate insider is not liable to the
corporation for his profits from a short-swing transaction except to the
extent that he realizes a direct pecuniary benefit.' 2
Prior to the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, inves-
tors considered the use of confidential information by corporate insid-
ers for personal financial gain a normal incident of high corporate
for the trusts, the district court implied that the co-trustee had actually made the purchase. 530 F.
Supp. at 785.
6. 682 F.2d at 644. At the time of the contested transactions, Horton's sons were nineteen
and twenty-two years old, attended school full-time, and lived apart from their father most of the
year. Id. Only the younger son received full financial support from Horton. 530 F. Supp. at 786,
7. Federal jurisdiction was founded on the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa (1976), which gives federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over actions involving violations of
the Securities Exchange Act.
8. A short-swing transaction occurs when a corporate insider effects a purchase and sale, or
sale and purchase, of the corporation's stock within the statutory six month period. See, e.g.,
Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1272 n.32 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'don other grounds
sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). Short-swing profits under section
16(b) arise when the insider purchases stock in the corporation and within six months sells it at a
higher price, or when he sells the stock and within six months repurchases it at a lower price. See
W. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 25 (1968). As the court in Horton
observed, "profit" in the latter instance is an avoided loss. 682 F.2d at 644. But cf. S. & S. Realty
Corp. v. Kleer-Vu Indus., Inc., 575 F.2d 1040, 1044 (2d Cir. 1978) ("The word 'recoverable' im-
plies the existence of a tangible asset or a fund. One would be hard put to recover the avoidance
of a loss.").
9. It is important to bear in mind the two distinct senses in which "beneficial owner" is used
in section 16(b) litigation. The term's first use is to identify a class of individuals (insiders) who
are subject to the provisions of section 16. Specifically, the section applies to directors, officers,
and benecial owners of more than ten percent of a class of equity securities. See supra note 2.
Courts have also used the term to determine whether an insider is liable under section 16(b). The
corporation may recover from the insider the short-swing "profit realized by him" where he bene-
ficially owns the shares (or their proceeds) used in the allegedly improper transaction. See infra
notes 32-61 and accompanying text. The cases discussed herein involve beneficial ownership in
the latter sense. That is, the person defending himself against the corporate claim is admittedly an
insider subject to section 16, and the court must determine whether he is liable under section
16(b). See Whiting v. Dow Chem. Co., 386 F. Supp. 1130, 1131-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aj'd, 523
F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1975).
10. 530 F. Supp. at 786.
11. Circuit Judge Wood dissented in part. 682 F.2d at 647.
12. Id. at 646.
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office.' 3 Section 16 of the Act 4 sought to prevent what Congress per-
ceived as unfair stock price manipulation by corporate officials dealing
in their company's securities, t5 and to renew investor confidence in the
exchange markets.' 6 Accordingly, courts have generally interpreted the
section as protecting outsider shareholders--those without access to
confidential information.'
7
The remedy chosen by Congress to prevent the unfair use of inside
information18 requires that a corporate insider surrender to the corpo-
ration' 9 his short-swing profits, regardless of whether he actually used
13. 10 SEC ANN. REP. 50 (1944); 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1037 (2d ed. 1961).
Cf. S. THOMPSON, LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS AND OTHER OFFICERS AND AGENTS OF CORPORA-
TIONs 360-61 (1880) (director need only disclose transactions "which will benefit [him] in any
manner different from the manner in which all the shareholders will be benefitted").
14. For more information on section 16(b), see generally Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading
Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARV. L. REv. 385 (1953); Rubin & Feldman, Statutory
Inhibitions Upon Unfair Use of Corporate Information by Insiders, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 468 (1947); 2
J. CORP. L. 188 (1976); Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 1346 (1955 & Supp. 1982).
15. A list of these manipulative practices is set out in Letter from the Counsel for the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency to the Senate Banking and Currency Committee (Feb. 18,
1933), reprinted in 5 J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES
ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, Item 15 at 32 (1973). For some specific
examples of insider abuse, see S. REp. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-9, reprinted in 5 J. EL-
LENBERGER & E. MAHAR, supra, at Item 17; S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55-68, reprinted
in 5 J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, supra, at Item 21.
16. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 5 J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR,
supra note 15, at Item 18. See also Wagman v. Astle, 380 F. Supp. 497, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
17. Eg., Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943); Epstein v. Shindler, 200 F. Supp. 836, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Fistel v. Christman, 133 F.
Supp. 300, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Roberts v. Eaton, 119 F. Supp. 362, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), aft'd,
212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954); 2 L. Loss, supra note 13, at 1041. Cf.
Champion Home Builders Co. v. Jeffress, 490 F.2d 611, 619 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986
(1974) (statute protects both minority shareholders and the general public); Magida v. Continental
Can Co., 231 F.2d 843, 846 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 972 (1956) (same).
18. Several commentators have suggested that insider trading can produce an economic ben-
efit by providing outsider shareholders with accurate information concerning the worth of their
securities. See, e.g., H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); H. MANNE
& E. SOLOMON, WALL STREET IN TRANsION (1974); Wu, An Economist Looks at Section 16 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 260 (1968). For responses to Professor
Manne's criticisms of the insider trading rules, see Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to
Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REv. 1425 (1967); Painter, Book Review,
35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 146 (1966). For a general discussion of the problems of enforcing section
16(b), see Munter, Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: An Alternative to "Burning
Down the Barn in Order to Kill the Rats," 52 CORNELL L. REv. 69 (1966).
19. Though the corporation will usually bring the suit against the director, any stockholder,
after making a proper demand on the corporation, may institute the action whether or not he
owned shares at the time of the alleged improper transactions. See R. FROME & V. ROSENZWEIG,
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confidential information in making the transactions.2" Judicial inter-
pretation of section 16(b) reflects a gradual evolution from an "objec-
tive" standard to a "pragmatic" standard in the application of the
statute to the questioned transaction.21 Briefly stated,22 the objective
analysis requires only a determination of whether a transaction or class
of investor is within the scope of section 16(b),23 while the pragmatic
approach, applied to "unorthodox" transactions, 24 requires a determi-
nation of whether the transaction is of a kind that might give rise to
speculative abuse.25 Courts have used the pragmatic test to determine
whether specific stock transfers constitute a "purchase" or "sale" under
SALES OF SECURITIES BY CORPORATE INSIDERS 229-30 (2d ed. 1975); 2 L. Loss, supra note 13, at
1045-47.
20. Eg., Booth v. Varian Assocs., 334 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961
(1965); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1959); Prager v. Sylvestri, 449 F. Supp. 425,
429 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Schur v. Salzman, 365 F. Supp. 725, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Blau v. Potter,
[1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,115, at 94,447 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 1973).
Thomas Corcoran, one of the draftsmen of the Securities Exchange Act, explained:
You hold the director, irrespective of any intention or expectation to sell the security
within 6 months after, because it will be absolutely impossible to prove the existence of
such intention or expectation, and you have to have this crude rule of thumb, because
you cannot undertake the burden of having to prove that the director intended, at the
time he bought, to get out on a short swing.
Stock Exchange Practices. Hearings on S. 2693 Before the Senate Banking and Currency Commit-
tee, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6557 (1934), reprinted in 6 J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, supra note 15,
at Item 22 [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S2693].
21. A considerable amount of scholarly comment on these two standards exists. For some of
the better sources, see Hazen, The New Pragmatism Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 54 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1975); Tomlinson, Section 16(b): A Single Analysis of Purchases and
Sales-Merging the Objective and Pragmatic Anaoses, 1981 DUKE L.J. 941; Weinstock, Section
16(b) and the Doctrine of Speculative Abuse: How to Succeed in Being Subjective Without Really
Trying, 29 Bus. LAW. 1153 (1974); Wentz, Refining a Crude Rule: The Pragmatic Approach to
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 221 (1975); Note, Insider
Liability for Short-Swing Profits: The Substance and Function of the Pragmatic Approach, 72
MICH. L. REv. 592 (1974); Note, Reliance Electric and 16(b) Litigation: A Return to the Objective
Approach 58 VA. L. REv. 907 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, Reliance Electric].
22. A survey ofjudicial articulation of the objective and pragmatic approaches is beyond the
scope of this comment.
23. Note, Reliance Electric, supra note 21, at 912. See, e.g., Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352
F.2d 156, 165 (3d Cir. 1965).
24. This term, used by Professor Loss in 2 L. Loss, supra note 13, at 1069, was adopted by the
Supreme Court in Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 593
(1973). Among the transactions mentioned by the Court as being unorthodox were stock conver-
sions, exchanges pursuant to mergers, stock reclassifications and dealings in options. Id. at n.24
(citing 2 L. Loss, supra note 13, at 1069).
25. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 594-95 (1973); Pet-
teys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 535 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967); Ferraiolo v.
Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 344-45 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959); Makofsky v.
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section 16(b). They have not found that test useful in determining who
is a "beneficial owner. 26
The Securities and Exchange Commission has never spoken directly
to the question of what constitutes beneficial ownership under section
16(b). Moreover, because the Commission is not responsible for en-
forcement of the provision, it has consistently refused to issue opinions
concerning investors' liability thereunder.27  Thus, in structuring their
transactions, insiders can only hope that the federal courts will not void
their stock transactions retroactively.28 Several Commission releases,
however, have defined the circumstances under which an insider is a
beneficial owner subject to the disclosure requirements of section
16(a).29 Moreover, a regulation which sets out those relationships be-
Ultra Dynamics Corp., 383 F. Supp. 631, 637-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Popkin v. Dingman, 366 F.
Supp. 534, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
26. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
27. Thus, for example, the commission refuses to issue no-action letters in the context of
section 16(b). "[T]he staff as a matter of policy will not issue no-action letters regarding section
16(b) because the Commission has no enforcement responsibilities under that section. Likewise,
. . the staff will not issue letters which have the effect of interpreting that provision." Letter
from Securities and Exchange Commission to Chromalloy American Corp. (May 15, 1980)
(available on LEXIS, Fedsec library. Noact file).
28. See Note, "Beneficial Ownership" Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 446, 463 (1977).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1976). In general terms, this provision of the Act requires corporate
insiders to file a statement each month with the Commission indicating any changes in their hold-
ings of the corporation's securities. Intended as another weapon against unfair manipulation, the
section aims to "encourage the voluntary maintenance of proper fiduciary standards by those in
control of large corporate enterprises whose securities are registered on the public exchanges."
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 5 J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, supra
note 15, at Item 18.
One early release under the Act ruled that a trustee who will receive the trust corpus in the
event the beneficiary fails to attain a certain age must report the trust's stock transactions under
section 16(a). SEC Exchange Act Release No. 1965 (1938), 11 Fed. Reg. 10971 (1946). But cf.
Cook & Feldman, supra note 14, at 385 ("[I]f he has merely a remote contingent interest, there is
some difference of opinion as to whether he should report the trust transactions.").
In SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-7793, 3 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 26,031 (Jan. 19, 1966),
the Commission opined, "A person also may be regarded as the beneficial owner of securities held
in the name of another person, if by reason of any contract, understanding, relationship, agree-
ment, or other arrangement, he obtains therefrom benefits substantially equivalent to those of
ownership." A month later, the Commission clarified the scope of this release, stating, "the fact
that ownership of securities and transactions in those securities are reported under section 16(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not necessarily mean that liability will result therefrom
under section 16(b)." SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-7824, 3 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
26,030 (Feb. 14, 1966).
Recently, in SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-18114, 3 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 26,062
(Sept. 24, 198 1), the Commission enumerated some of the generally accepted indicia of beneficial
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tween an insider and others that give rise to beneficial ownership under
section 16(a) augments these releases.3" Federal courts have only re-
cently begun to look to the disclosure provisions for assistance in an-
swering questions concerning section 16(b). 31
In Blau v. Lehman,32 the Supreme Court rendered its only decision
regarding an insider's liability for a related party's profits.33 The Court
held that the plaintiff corporation 34 could not recover the entire short-
swing profit of a brokerage firm to which one of plaintiff's directors
belonged. Rather, the Court limited plaintiffs recovery to the direc-
tor's proportionate share of the profits.35 Despite the likelihood that its
decision would promote the exchange of confidential information
among insiders and their partners, 36 the Court found sufficient support
for its holding in the legislative history of the Securities Exchange
Act.37 Lehman did not, however, suggest any general standard for de-
ownership. These include (1) the right to vote the shares; (2) the right to control the stock's trans-
fer, (3) the right to control the income from the securities; and (4) the right to control the proceeds
in liquidation.
30. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-8 (1981). Under the regulation, beneficial ownership includes own-
ership as a trustee where either the trustee or members of his immediate family, including any
stepchildren, have a vested interest in the income or assets of the trust.
31. See Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1030
(1981). Cf. Whiting v. Dow Chem. Co., 386 F. Supp. 1130, 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aft'd, 523 F.2d
680 (2d Cir. 1975).
32. 368 U.S. 405 (1962). This case is noted in 46 MARQ. L. REv. 246 (1962).
33. See Note, supra note 28, at 452.
34. The suit was brought derivatively on behalf of the corporation.
35. 368 U.S. at 413-14. The Court conceded that the partnership might function as an insider
where it deputizes one of its partners, himself an insider, to act for the partnership. Id. at 409-10.
See generally W. PAINTER, supra note 8, at 53-96. In Lehman, the court of appeals permitted the
corporation to recover the insider's share of the profits even though he had disclaimed them. Blau
v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786, 791 (2d Cir. 1960), af'd, 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
36. 368 U.S. at 414 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d at 799
(Clark, Circuit Justice, dissenting).
37. The original House and Senate bills contained a section which would have rendered any
recipient of inside information liable for his short-swing profits. The provision read, in pertinent
part: "Any profit made by any person, to whom such unlawful disclosure shall have been made,
in respect of any transaction or transactions in such registered security within a period not exceed-
ing six months after such disclosure shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer. . . ." S.
2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 15(b)(3) (1934), reprinted in 11 J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, supra
note 15, at Item 34; H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 15(b)(3) (1934), reprinted in 10 J. EL-
LENBERGER & E. MAHAR, supra note 15, at Item 24. Thus, the Lehman Court concluded that
Congress' failure to enact the provision was persuasive against allowing recovery of the profits of
the corporate insider's partners. 368 U.S. at 411-12. But see supra note 35.
The same House bill had an analogous provision which would have attributed the stock of an
insider's spouse, child, parent or trustee to the insider. A defendant could avoid this attribution by
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termining under what circumstances a particular relationship between
an insider and one to whom short-swing profits accrue might give rise
to section 16(b) liability.
The issue of insider liability for a spouse's profits arose tangentially
in Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. v. Walet.3 8 The defendant, a corporate
director, argued that half of the profits had accrued to his wife under
Louisiana's community property law. The district court rejected this
argument and granted the corporation full recovery, observing that the
insider would otherwise have a one-half undivided interest in any unre-
covered profits.3 9 While admitting that its decision might conflict with
Louisiana community property law, the court held that the federal pol-
icy embodied in the Securities Exchange Act prevailed. 4
In Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas,4 t the defendant director
was the sole trustee of nineteen trusts which had realized short-swing
profits as a result of a merger of two corporations. After the merger,
the new corporation sued to recover the profits of all of the trusts.4"
The district court refused to hold the insider liable, pointing out that he
had no power to revoke any of the trusts, except for his own.43 Thus,
the plaintiff corporation recovered only the profit of the trust of which
the defendant was the beneficiary.'
In Blau v. Potter,45 the District Court for the Southern District of
New York confronted a slightly different issue: whether the transac-
tions of a corporate insider and his wife could be considered together in
sustaining the burden of showing that he neither approved of the transaction nor attempted to
evade any of the act's provisions. H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 19(d) (1934), reprinted in 10 J.
ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, supra note 15, at Item 24.
38. 104 F. Supp. 20 (E.D. La. 1952), afd, 202 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 346 U.S. 820
(1953),
39. Id. at 25.
40. Id.
41. 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
42 The beneficiaries of these trusts consisted largely of members of the defendant's family,
id at 965, including his ex-wife. Id. at 967.
43. Id.
44. As to the familial relation, the court said, "Whether [defendant] held a beneficial interest
m that stock is a question of fact to be determined from all the evidence. Of course, he had the
normal interest in seeing that members of his family were well and comfortable, but this does not
come within the Section 16(b) definition of 'any profit realized by him."' 239 F. Supp. at 967
(quoting Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403,414 (1962). However, the court apparently acknowledged
the potential liability of the defendant for the profits of the other trusts: "The plaintiff does not
present any substantial evidence that the trust beneficiaries received trust proceeds in lieu of sup-
port from the defendant." Id.
45. [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,115 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 1973).
Number 2]
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determining liability under section 16(b).4 6 According to the testimony,
the wife maintained her own brokerage account, kept her funds sepa-
rate from those of her husband, did not consult her husband on the
purchases at issue or any other purchases, and contributed no money
for household or personal expenses. 47 Faced with this unrebutted evi-
dence, the court refused to treat the wife's purchase and the husband's
subsequent sale as a single impermissible short-swing transaction.48
In Whiting v. Dow Chemical Co.,4 9 however, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals treated the wife's sale of stock and her husband's
subsequent exercise of an option to purchase 50 as one transaction, hold-
ing the insider husband liable to the corporation for the loss avoided
when the stock price dropped. Although the husband and wife kept
their respective stock holdings segregated, the evidence revealed that
the two filed joint tax returns, used the same financial advisors, and
consulted each other concerning financial matters. Furthermore, the
wife's dividend income from her considerable stock holdings went to
provide for various family expenses.5 The Second Circuit held that an
insider beneficially owns the stock holdings of his spouse where the
ordinary rewards of stock ownership are used for their joint benefit.52
46. Between November of 1966 and January of 1977, the defendant's wife bought 2800
shares of stock in the plaintiff corporation. "Less than six months later, [the defendant] sold
22,400 shares" at a higher price. Id. at 94,476. The plaintiff sought to have the court treat the
transactions as if one person, the defendant insider, had effected both of them. The court's resolu-
tion of the issue turned on a determination of whether the defendant beneficially owned his wife's
stock for the purpose of section 16(b). Id.
47. Id. at 94,477. As one commentator has pointed out, this case involves "an extreme set of
facts." Note, supra note 28, at 454.
48. "Tlhe uncontroverted testimony in this case clearly establishes that no benefit has inured
to Mr. Potter from the securities purchased by his wife. Under these circumstances, I decline to
attribute those purchases to him." [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,115, at
94,478. Cf. B.T. Babbitt, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1976) (parties stipulated that
wife's stock was attributable to her insider spouse); Schur v. Salzman, 365 F. Supp. 725, 732
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (officer-director held to be beneficial owner of shares purchased with funds from
joint bank account with wife).
49. 523 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1975).
50. Id. at 682. Interestingly, the defendant insider used funds borrowed from his wife to
exercise the purchase option.
51. Id. "[W]hile they continue to live as a married couple, there is hardly anything Mrs.
Whiting gets out of the ownership that her [her husband] does not share." Id. at 688.
52. Id. These "rewards of ownership" include dividend income, capital gains, and "the
power to dispose of the shares" to one's children by gift or by testament. Id. See also Note,
Securities Law-Insider Liabiliy Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934-
Whiting v. Dow Chemical Co., 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 627 (1976); 2 J. Corp. L. 188
(1976).
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Applying this standard, the court of appeals found sufficient evidence
of such joint benefit to sustain the district court's judgment for the
plaintiff corporation.
The decision in Altamil Corp. v. Pryor5" further expanded the scope
of section 16(b) liability by attributing the wife's short-swing transac-
tions to her husband, a director of the plaintiff corporation, even
though the wife kept the proceeds in a separate account and did not use
them to support herself or her husband or to pay household obliga-
tions.5 4 Admitting that the Whiting "joint benefit" standard could not
be applied, the district court adopted a "control" test. Under this ap-
proach, an insider who can exercise complete control over his spouse's
stock transactions so as to increase her individual estate acts as a bene-
ficial owner of the spouse's stock.5 The court ruled that the benefit
received by the insider consisted of a diminished need to make taxable
transfers to his wife:.5 6
Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp. ,57 a recent case from the Ninth Circuit,
involved the liability of an insider for the short-swing profits of his
mother, who had granted him a general power of attorney over her
affairs." The court justified its finding against the director on two dis-
tinct grounds. First, the insider exercised control over the securities
53. 405 F. Supp. 1222 (S.D. Ind. 1975).
54. Id. at 1225.
55. Id. at 1226. Cf. Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
1016 (1954) (control of an insider corporation gives the controlling entity insider status).
56. Id. at 1225. The evidence showed that the defendant had in the past made such transfers
to his wife. Id at 1225-26. Cf. J.P. Morgan & Co., 10 S.E.C. 119 (1941), in which the SEC
recognized the pecuniary interest of a father in his adult daughter's stock. The issue in the case
was whether the father was disqualified from serving as an indenture trustee for certain securities
by reason of his daughter's ownership of over ten percent of a class of the underwriter's stock. In
holding that the father was the beneficial owner of his daughter's shares, and thus ineligible under
the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 310(b)(6)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(b)(6)(B) (1976), the Commission
noted:
[N]early $200,000 par value of the stock yielding nearly $8,000 per year is held by Lef-
fingwell's daughter. Leffingwell testified that he gave it to her, not only to divest himself
of its ownership but also in order to capitalize an allowance he had been giving to her.
He further testified that she had four children and needed the income. It may be true
that a man is not generally responsible for the support of his grown daughter or his
grandchildren, and it may be that if anything occurred to stop the income on that invest-
ment, LeffingweU could wash his hands of the whole matter and suffer no loss as a matter
of law. But to say that his daughter's interest in that investment is of no pecuniary
interest to him is to ignore realities.
10 S.E.C. at 147.
57. 639 F.2d 516 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1030 (1981).
58. Id. at 523.
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and possessed an unrestricted ability to use the proceeds. This indi-
cated that the short-swing gain came within the language "profit real-
ized by him" of section 16(b).5 9 Second, the director satisfied the
requirements of beneficial ownership under section 16(a)60 and re-
ceived sufficient actual rewards of ownership to warrant attributing his
mother's stock to him for purposes of section 16(b). 6' Thus, the deci-
sion reflected elements of both theAltamil "control" approach and the
Whiting "rewards of ownership" test.
In CBI Industries, Inc. v. Horton ,62 the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals invoked a new standard for determining section 16(b) liability,
holding that "profit realized by him" encompasses only direct pecuni-
ary benefits.63 Circuit Judge Posner, writing for the court, began by
determining the nature and amount of gain, if any, which the defend-
ant Horton realized from the contested sale and purchase. Had Horton
subsequently bought shares for his own account, he clearly would have
violated section 16(b). 4 Because the defendant purchased shares for
his sons' trusts, however, the court had to face the issue of whether he
had realized any profit which the plaintiff corporation could recover
under that section.65 Judge Posner pointed out that Horton had a gen-
eral power to manage the trusts, but could not divert their income to
59. Id. at 523-24. The evidence showed that the insider controlled his mother's investments
in corporate securities, determined the timing of her stock purchases, and used her assets to fund
advantageous investment opportunities. Id. As of 1973, the director owed his mother over
$700,000, according to the district court. Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., [1977-78 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,008, at 91,529 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 1977).
60. While admitting that the Commission's views in Release No. 7793, supra note 29, apply
to beneficial ownership under the reporting requirements of section 16(a), the court ruled "[l]t is
not far-fetched similarly to determine by reference to § 16(a) what stock those insiders own for
§ 16(b) liability." 639 F.2d at 525. See also Lewis v. Varnes, 505 F.2d 785, 788 (2d Cir. 1974);
Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 268 (2d Cir. 1969), cert denied, 396 U.S. 1036
(1970).
61. 639 F.2d at 526.
62. 682 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1982).
63. Id. at 646.
64. Id. at 644.
65. The court assumed that the trusts had realized gain from the purchase of stock at a lower
price than that which Horton had received upon the prior sale of his own stock. Id. Thus, the
court reduced the ultimate issue to whether the trusts' gains were attributable to Horton. Judge
Posner did not discuss a possible alternative holding-that neither Horton nor the trusts had real-
ized any gain, since the transactions were made through separate accounts. Such a holding would
in any event be unsatisfactory because, for example, an insider might shield himself from section
16(b) liability by maintaining separate accounts for himself and his wife, a device disapproved in
the Whiting case. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
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for his own use.66 Horton would receive money from the trusts only
upon the death of both sons without issue before the sons reached
twenty-five years of age.67 This contingent remainder interest, the
court held, was too remote to warrant attribution of the repurchased
shares to Horton as the beneficial owner.61 Judge Posner thus con-
cluded that the instant case was distinguishable from Whiting and
Whittaker, where the corporate insiders had direct access to the pro-
ceeds of the short-swing transactions.69
The court conceded that the defendant may have realized some non-
pecuniary or indirect benefit from the transactions. An improvement
in his sons' financial positions probably provided Horton with an en-
hanced sense of well-being. 70 Also, any gain realized by the trusts
would reduce the need for Horton to make taxable transfers to his
sons.7' The court ruled, however, that neither of these two benefits
constituted profit under section 16(b). As to the former, the court was
not inclined to determine that the 1934 Congress intended to make
emotional enrichment recoverable by a plaintiff corporation.72 As to
the latter, the court explicitly rejected the Atami 73 holding that such a
saving to the insider by way of reduced taxable transfers results in sec-
tion 16(b) liability.7 4 Judge Posner also argued that policy considera-
tions supported the court's refusal to hold Horton liable on the basis of
these benefits. A finding of liability, he suggested, would have undesir-
able consequences for the management of stock portfolios by insiders75
66. Id. at 645.
67. Id.
68. Id. The court suggested that multiplying the probability of such a joint death by the
amount in controversy would yield the expected value to the defendant of the trust profits. This
amount would be de minimis, contended Judge Posner, and the plaintiff would not bother to sue
unless some other ground of recovery were present. Id.
69. Id.
70. "A person's 'wealth,' in a realistic though not pecuniary sense, is increased by increasing
the pecuniary wealth of his children. . . provided only that he has the normal human feelings
toward his children." Id. at 646.
71. Id.
72. "But taking a 'realistic' approach to the interpretation of ['profit realized by him'] would
result in placing greater restrictions on corporate insiders than Congress can plausibly be thought
to have intended in 1934, when notions of conflict of interest were less exacting than they are
today." Id.
73. See supra text accompanying note 56. Cf. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239
F. Supp. 962, 967, quoted supra note 44.
74. 682 F.2d at 646. The Horton court did not, however, rule that .41tamil would have been
decided differently under the new test.
75. "Thus the implication of holding Horton liable in this case would be that neither he nor
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and for the enforcement of section 16(b) by the federal courts.76
The plaintiff in Horton also contended that "beneficial ownership"
for purposes of section 16(b) should be determined with reference to
the regulation governing the section 16(a) reporting requirements."
Rejecting this argument, the court stated that Horton was an insider by
reason of his status as a director, not as a beneficial owner of ten per-
cent of a class of equity securities. 78 On this point, Circuit Judge Wood
dissented from the court's opinion, arguing that the regulation sheds at
least some light on the meaning of section 16(b).79
An examination of federal court decisions that have construed the
phrases "beneficial owner" and "profit realized by him" reveals that
the Horton court had a number of standards from which to choose in
deciding whether to hold the defendant liable to the corporation.
While the Marquette80 court laid down no specific test for determining
whether a benefit constitutes recoverable profit, it clearly indicated that
any corporate insider could manage or control... an investment portfolio containing the stock
of his company without being in jeopardy of violating section 16(b)." Id
76. "Though some economists believe that emotional relationships within the family can be
expressed in economic terms. we doubt that the framers of section 16(b) would have wanted
to complicate enforcement of the statute to this degree merely to make an already Draconian strict
liability statute still more Draconian. It would be only a little simpler to determine the effect of
the trust's profit on Horton's gift-giving to his sons." Id. at 647.
77. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-8(a) provides, "Beneficial ownership of a security for the purpose of
section 16(a) shall include: (1) The ownership of securities as a trustee where either the trustee or
members of his immediate family have a vested interest in the income or corpus of the trust
. .. Sons and daughters of the trustee are members of his immediate family, regardless of
their dependency status. Id. at § 240.16a-8(3)(1).
78. 682 F.2d at 646. Note that section 16(a) refers twice to beneficial ownership. The rele-
vant text reads:
Every person who is directly or indirectly the benefcial owner of more than 10 per
centum of any class of any equity security. . . or who is a director or an officer of the
issuer of such security, shall file . . . a statement with the Commission . . . of the
amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which he is the benefcial owner ....
15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (emphasis added). The first reference to beneficial ownership defines a class of
individuals who are insiders subject to the disclosure provisions. The second instance relates to
those transactions an insider must disclose. See supra note 9 (regarding the role of beneficial
ownership in § 16(b) litigation). Clearly, all insiders must disclose changes in ownership of the
shares which they beneficially own. See Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 525 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1030 (1981). Thus, the definition of beneficial ownership in Regula-
tion 16a-8, supra note 77, should apply to all insiders, not just those who are insiders by virtue of
beneficially owning 10% of a class of stock. See SEC v. Golconda Mining Corp., 291 F. Supp.
125, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (director held to have violated the regulation). The Horton court's con-
tention that Regulation 16a-8 would not apply to an officer or director is simply incorrect.
79. 682 F.2d at 647-48.
80. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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an insider's interest in securing his family's prosperity is not such a
benefit.8t The Whiting 2 test, if applied to the facts in Horton, would
have resulted in section 16(b) liability if the plaintiff had shown that the
rewards of stock ownership jointly benefited both the defendant and
the trust beneficiaries.8 3 Under the Altamil standard,84 liability would
depend on whether the trustee exercised control over the trusts' stock to
such an extent that he could increase his sons' wealth through short-
swing transactions and thereby reduce the necessity of using his own
funds to support them.85 Finally, under the two approaches set out in
Whittaker, 6 the defendant Horton could have been held liable either
by reason of his ability to exercise control over the trust securities and
their proceeds, 7 or by reason of a requirement that he disclose the
transactions under section 16(a).88 Faced with this wide range of stan-
dards, the Seventh Circuit chose to formulate a new test, namely,
whether the insider received a direct pecuniary benefit 9 from the
transaction."
In section 16(b) cases, courts have struggled to find some balance
between the clear congressional desire to curb trading on inside infor-
mation9' and the crude statutory provision92 that only weakly reflects
this aim.93 The Horton case represents this same tension. On the one
hand, compliance with the clear legislative purpose of discouraging
short-swing trading argues for imposing liability on an insider trustee
who uses confidential information to increase the wealth of his family
members, the trust beneficiaries. On the other hand, Congress' failure
to give the corporation a cause of action against a non-insider who
trades on inside information militates against trustee liability, where
the trustee cannot control the disposition of the profit.
81. See supra note 44.
82. whiting v. Dow Chem. Co., 523 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1975).
83. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
84. Altamil Corp. v. Pryor, 405 F. Supp. 1222 (S.D. Ind. 1975).
85. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
86. Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1030 (1981).
87. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
89. This standard was recommended in Note, supra note 28, at 461.
90. See supra text accompanying note 63.
91. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
92. See Hearings on S.2693, supra note 20, at 6557 (statement of Thomas Corcoran).
93. For example, if Congress had truly wanted to discourage short-swing trading, it should
not have excluded recipients of confidential information from the Act's coverage. See supra note
37.
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When first confronted with the issue and the court's reasoning, it is
difficult to disagree with the Seventh Circuit's decision in Horton. As
Circuit Judge Wood indicates, the case poses "a very close question."94
However, the court could have approached the problem by considering
whether the relationship of the trustee to the trust beneficiaries could
increase the possibility of speculative abuse. Courts have frequently
used this so-called "pragmatic" test to determine whether a transfer of
stock is a sale or purchase.95 Courts have not used this test to ascertain
whether a third person's gain should be attributed to the insider under
section 16(b), although the Whittaker court paid lip service to it.9 6 As-
suming a set of facts such as those in Horton, it is possible that a corpo-
rate insider might wish to trade in his own company's shares for the
benefit of family members to whom he would otherwise give financial
support.97
Admittedly, section 16(b) does not generally impose liability on non-
insiders who trade on the basis of confidential information received
from an insider.98 The section, however, does not apply solely to the
insider. For example, if the trust beneficiaries in Horton had been the
wife or minor children of the insider, the court probably would have
attributed the trust profits to the trustee. The inquiry should focus on
whether the relationship between the insider and the "direct" benefici-
ary is of such a nature that the former will be likely to satisfy his volun-
tarily assumed duties by engaging in speculative trading. If so, liability
should be imposed. The Horton court justifiably expresses concern
over how to limit an "indirect benefit" standard such as that set out in
Alamil.99 It may not be feasible for courts to create immutable princi-
ples to govern corporate insiders who effect a savings for their family
members via short-swing transactions. However, courts could conceiv-
94. 682 F.2d at 647.
95. See text and cases cited supra note 25 for a description of the pragmatic approach to
defining sale and purchase.
96. The court in Whittaker mentioned the trend toward a pragmatic application of section
16(b), but did not tie the pragmatic analysis to its discussion of beneficial ownership. Whittaker v.
Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 522, 525-27 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1030 (1981). In the
other beneficial ownership cases discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 32-61, the courts
did not mention the pragmatic approach. See also Altamil Corp. v. Pryor, 405 F. Supp. 1222,
1224 (S.D. Ind. 1975) ("Mhe rule is an objective one. ... )
97. For example, in Horton the defendant provided full financial support to one of his sons,
530 F. Supp. at 786, a fact which the Seventh Circuit conveniently ignored.
98. See supra note 37.
99. 682 F.2d at 646.
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ably hold that certain relationships, such as parent-adult child, give rise
to a rebuttable presumption °° that the insider has realized a recover-
able saving. Such an approach seems consistent with the view that the
statute must be liberally construed to accomplish the express policy of
the legislature.'
The Horton test represents a slight retreat from the expansion of the
scope of section 16(b) liability. In future cases, plaintiffs are likely to
find it more difficult to recover short-swing profits from a corporate
insider who permits the members of his immediate family to share in
the advantages of access to confidential corporate information. If the
insider retains no control over the profits and receives no "direct bene-
fit" from them, he may effect transfers to members of his family and
realize a substantial savings on his out-of-pocket expenses, yet escape
liability to the corporation. °2
By holding that a corporate insider must receive a direct pecuniary
benefit from a short-swing transaction in order for the corporation to
recover profit under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, the
Seventh Circuit has made it possible for insiders to use confidential
information for the benefit of their family members through the use of
a trust device. This decision seems likely to increase the occurrences of
speculative trading by those privy to corporate secrets.
R.E. H.
100 Cf. supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text for an example of a corporate insider who
successfully rebutted a presumption that his wife's short-swing profits could be attributed to him.
101. See, e.g., Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 532 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006
(1967).
102. The Horton court implied that it would have held the defendant liable if he had been
legally obliged to support his two sons. 682 F.2d at 645. Also, the court's "direct pecuniary bene-
fit" standard would logically apply where both the sale and purchase of shares were made through
a trust account. The implication is that a corporate insider will not be liable under section 16(b) if
he sets up irrevocable trusts for his non-dependent family members and carries on short-swing
trading in his capacity as trustee.
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